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LONG TERM CARE INSURANCE PUZZLE1 
Pierre PESTIEAU2          Gregory PONTHIERE3 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the alternative explanatory factors of the so-called long term care 
insurance puzzle, namely the fact that so few people purchase a long term care insurance whereas this 
would seem to be a rational conduct given the high probability of dependence and the high costs of long 
term care. For that purpose, we survey various theoretical and empirical studies of the demand and 
supply of long term care insurance. We discuss the vicious circle in which the long term care insurance 
market is stuck: that market is thin because most people find the existing insurance products too 
expensive, and, at the same time, the products supplied by insurance companies are too expensive 
because of the thinness of the market. Moreover, we also show that, whereas some explanations of the 
puzzle involve a perfect rationality of agents on the LTC insurance market, others rely, on the contrary, 
on various behavioral imperfections.  
Keywords: long term care insurance, dependence, annuity puzzle 
JEL classification: I18, J14, G22. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In most OECD countries, the era of long-term care (LTC) has arrived. More than two 
out of five people aged 65 or older report having some type of functional limitation 
(sensory, physical, mental, self-care disability, or difficulty leaving home), and, as 
such, are not autonomous, and require adequate care.4 A few years from now, the aging 
trend will accelerate, fueled by the large “baby boomer” generation, and the relative 
importance of people aged 65 or older will more than double by 2050, according to the 
forecasts of the European Union (2009). On the other hand, with the drastic change in 
family values, the increasing number of childless households and the mobility of 
children, the number of dependent elderly who cannot rely on the assistance of anyone 
is increasing.5 Those two parallel evolutions –  demographic and societal – explain why 
there is a mounting demand on governments and the market to provide alternatives to 
the family, which has been, across epochs, the largest provider of LTC services (even 
though those services, by being informal, remain hard to measure). One may hope that 
both private and social LTC insurance will grow substantially in coming decades. But 
there are a number of problems that both the State and the market have to solve before 
they can replace family solidarity. The problems of private LTC can be coined by the 
concept of LTC insurance puzzle. 
There exist in the economic literature a large number of puzzles. One of the most 
famous ones is the annuity puzzle.6 Accordingly, whereas economic theory says that 
annuities are quite valuable and that retirees ought to hold most of their portfolio in this 
form, empirical evidence shows that most individuals do not voluntarily annuitize their 
resources, and prefer to hold them at the risk of turning penniless if they live “too 
long”. Like any puzzle, this one can be explained in part, and here are the traditional 
explanatory factors for keeping one’s assets and not annuitizing them: 
• high annuity prices, as there is a sizeable mortality difference between 
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 See Kemper and Murtaugh (1991) on the probabilities to enter a nursing home in the U.S. 
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annuitants and the general population (adverse selection) 
• the bequests motive, that is, a desire to leave wealth to one's children 
• families as (partial) substitutes for private annuity markets7 
• high discount rates or underassessment of life expectancy 
• uninsured medical expenditure shocks or children’s income shocks; the 
incompleteness of other markets ultimately limit the purchase of life 
annuities8 
Quite interestingly, parallel to the annuity puzzle, we can also talk of a LTC insurance 
puzzle. Accordingly, in almost every country, very few people are insured against the 
risk of old-age dependence costs, and yet, as for the purchase of annuities, it would 
seem so rational to purchase an insurance against LTC, on the grounds that this is a 
protection against a risk that is sizeable and increasing.9 This paper is dedicated to the 
causes of this puzzle. As we will see, some of the causes are the same as those invoked 
for the annuity puzzle. Anticipating on the rest of this paper, here are the causes that we 
will discuss: 
• Excessive costs (loading factors and adverse selection) 
• Social assistance acting as Good Samaritan 
• Trust into family solidarity 
• Unattractive rule of reimbursement (lump sum) 
• Myopia or ignorance 
                                                        
7
 For example, couple members who pool their retirement resources using a common budget constraint can pool 
mortality risk fairly effectively, and thus value annuities less than individuals who are singles. 
8
 The intuition behind that argument is that agents want to keep their lifetime savings as a precautionary wealth 
allowing them to face unexpected events against which they cannot insure, because of incomplete markets. 
9
 On the low proportion of people purchasing a private LTC insurance, see Brown et al (2006) and Kessler 
(2007). 
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• Denial of heavy dependence 
This short paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 7 present those diverse causes of 
the LTC insurance puzzle, by explaining how those particular factors may contribute to 
the underdevelopment of the LTC insurance market. Throughout our survey, we also 
review some empirical evidence supporting those explanations, and discuss their 
(in)compatibility with each others. Concluding remarks are drawn in Section 8. 
  
2. Excessive costs 
For most individuals, the cost of LTC in case of severe dependence appears high, if not 
prohibitive. Whereas the average pension of a French household is 1200 euros a month, 
the cost of a good nursing home runs much above that figure. The average cost of 
institutional long-term care for old persons in France is currently at 35 000 euros per 
dependent per year (see OECD, 2006), whereas the yearly price of a nursing home in the 
U.S. ranges between $40 000 and $75 000 (see Taleyson, 2003). But then how can we 
explain that individuals do not insure themselves against such high costs?A first, natural 
explanation of the low demand for LTC insurance is merely the high cost of the LTC 
insurance. Actually, according to Cutler (1993), 91% of non-insured people find LTC 
insurance too costly. One factor contributing to making the insurance expensive is that 
elderly people tend to postpone as late as possible their purchase, so as to get better 
information on the appropriate policy and on its cost (see Meier, 1999). Brown and 
Finkelstein (2004a) show that a typical LTC insurance policy purchased at age 65 has a 
0.18 loading factor (defined as one minus the ratio of the expected present value of the 
benefits over the premium).10 Those large loading factors may explain why the covering 
rate of the LTC insurance is so low. Regarding the causes of those high loading factors, 
Brown and Finkelstein argue that it is hard to discriminate between four causes : 
administrative costs, imperfect competition, asymmetric information and aggregate 
risk. All those causes imply a high loading factor, as well as limits in the benefits 
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 That loading factor is significantly larger than the typical load of 0.06 to 0.10 on acute health insurance 
policies (see Newhouse, 2002). 
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comprehensiveness (i.e. quantity rationing), which are also observed (i.e. the typically 
purchased policy covers only 1/3 of expected LTC expenditures). 
Note that Brown and Finkelstein also observe that loading factors differ considerably 
between individuals or group of individuals. They find loading factors of 0.44 for men 
and - 0.04 for women (that is, better than actuarially fair prices for women) with about 
the same rate of participation, which reveals a high within-household correlation for 
insurance decisions.11 
But the cost of LTC insurance may seem even more excessive given some private 
knowledge about one’s own health status. Actually, elderly people appear to have 
better information than the (public or private) insurance provider as to the occurrence 
of dependency (see Norton, 2000). It has also been observed that people buying LTC 
insurance contracts have a higher probability of becoming disabled than those who do 
not buy such contracts (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2003). Similarly, people who 
discontinue their contracts have a much lower probability of becoming disabled than 
those who do not (see Finkelstein et al., 2005). This is a classic health insurance 
adverse selection problem. The existence of an adverse selection problem on the LTC 
insurance market is confirmed by Sloan and Norton (1997)’s econometric study, which 
is based on two surveys for the U.S. (AHEAD – Asset and Health Dynamics – and 
HRS – Health and Retirement Survey). Sloan and Norton find a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between the subjective probability of entering a 
nursing home and the probability of purchasing LTC insurance.12 The presence of 
adverse selection is also confirmed by Courbage and Roudaut (2008), who find, on the 
basis of SHARE data for France (Survey on Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe), 
that there exists a positive and statistically significant correlation between, on the one 
hand, having a high risk of dependence (e.g. high BMI scores and high alcohol 
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 Regarding the causes of the men/women differential in loading factors, this may come from significant gender 
differences in the care utilization, due to women’s higher longevity, but, also, to the mere fact that elderly men 
are more likely to received unpaid informal aid from their spouses in comparison with elderly women.  
12
 Naturally, one cannot exclude the existence of moral hazard explaining that correlation. However, Sloan and 
Norton find that family structure variables (marital status and children), which should affect the occurrence of 
moral hazard here, do not influence the probability of purchasing LTC insurance. 
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consumption), and, on the other hand, the purchase of LTC insurance. Hence the 
plausible presence of adverse selection may contribute to explain the high LTC 
insurance costs, and, as a consequence, the LTC insurance puzzle. 
 
3. Social assistance acting as Good Samaritan 
Besides excessive insurance costs, another widespread argument is proposed to explain 
the LTC insurance puzzle. According to that argument, social assistance (Medicaid in 
the case of the U.S.) would crowd out private insurance (Norton, 2000). Actually, 
Sloan and Norton (1997) observe a negative correlation between Medicaid availability 
and the purchase of private LTC insurance. According to Brown and Finkelstein 
(2004b), the existence of a last resort payer like Medicaid reduces (even an actuarially 
fair) private insurance market by two thirds. They show that for men (women) with 
median assets, 60 % (75 %) of contributions to private insurance are redundant with 
Medicaid. On the other hand, Brown et al. (2006) show that, if the Medicaid resource 
test ceiling were raised up to $10 000 per year, private insurance coverage would only 
increase by 1.1 %.13 This latter study tends thus to qualify the size of the crowding out 
effect: even though this is statistically significant, there must necessarily be other forces 
driving the LTC insurance puzzle. The crowding out alone cannot do the entire job. 
To conclude, note that it is also important to distinguish here between two different 
cases of ‘abuse’ of social assistance.14 On the one hand, there exist some individuals 
who decide to spend all their resources while being young and healthy, because they 
know that the State will not drop them and will act as a Good Samaritan. On the other 
hand, there exist also other individuals, who either hide their resources, or strategically 
pass them to their children as inter vivos gifts, to be able to benefit from means tested 
benefits such as Medicaid in the US or APA in France. In a number of countries, the 
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 According to Brown et al (2006, p. 21), this minor impact from changing eligibility criteria is due to the fact 
that, as long as Medicaid remains a secondary payer, even without any asset limits to Medicaid eligibility a large 
portion of private insurance benefits are redundant of what Medicaid would otherwise have paid. 
14
 Of course the term ‘abuse’ is value-loaded, and one may prefer to talk about a ‘strategic use’ of the Medicaid 
social insurance system. 
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social assistance part of LTC is managed at the local level, and even though local 
authorities have the legal power to reclaim part of the estate of those having benefited 
from LTC assistance, public authorities are reluctant to do so. But whatever the case 
considered, the outcome for private LTC insurance is the same: because of the 
existence of the State, agents have little incentives to buy a private LTC insurance, as a 
result of a standard crowding out effect. 
 
4. Trust into family solidarity 
Whereas the State is often regarded as a major cause of the LTC insurance puzzle, the 
family is also widely cited as an alternative explanatory factor. The intuition behind 
that family explanation is not fundamentally different from the family explanation for 
the annuity puzzle. In each case, the puzzle can be solved by highlighting that the 
standard microeconomic argument supporting the purchase of annuities or of LTC 
insurance relies on a simplistic model, which may not take the richness of family life 
into account. 
In the case of LTC insurance, buying that kind of protection seems indeed rational 
under some particularly defined preferences, but may not be so if one has specific 
family concerns. More concretely, LTC insurance reduces the cost of 
institutionalization, and, thus, will not be bought by elderly parents who want to be 
aided by their children in case of dependency (see Pauly, 1990). Indeed, buying an LTC 
insurance is paradoxically the best way to be sent to an (anonymous) nursing home, 
instead of being helped at home by a family member. Thus, provided the elderly has a 
taste for being helped by his or her family, the incentive to buy a private LTC insurance 
is quite low, even in the absence of State assistance. 
Note, however, that the introduction of family concerns does not, on its own, suffice to 
lead to the LTC insurance puzzle. Actually, whether the parent is altruistic or not 
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matters a lot.15 If he is (sufficiently) altruistic, he will buy LTC insurance to avoid 
burdening his spouse or children in case of dependency (see Pauly, 1996), even though 
he would prefer being helped by his children from a purely self-oriented perspective. 
An altruistic parent does not want to impoverish his descendants, or to cause them 
troubles, and, as a consequence, he is likely to buy LTC insurance. On the contrary, if 
the elderly is not altruistic, he will behave strategically, and will use his estate to obtain 
assistance from his children, and, thus, will not purchase LTC insurance (see Norton, 
2000).16 
Note that the empirical literature is far from unanimous on the role of family concerns. 
Sloan and Norton (1997) show that the family does not seem to play a role in the U.S., 
as caring about the bequests left to descendants has a statistically insignificant impact 
on the demand for private LTC insurance. On the contrary, Courbage and Roudaut 
(2008), using the French SHARE data, show that being married and having children 
make it likelier to purchase private LTC insurance, in conformity with the theory under 
altruistic parents. 
 
5. Unattractive rule of reimbursement (lump sum) 
An alternative explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle may lie in the precise form of 
the LTC insurance contracts that can be found on the market. In the tradition of health 
care insurance, one would expect LTC insurance contracts to provide for the 
reimbursement of care and services costs, possibly up to a certain limit and with 
multiple options, including deductibles.  This is less and less the case. An increasing 
number of insurance markets, typically the French one, provide for the payment of a 
monthly cash benefit, which is proportionate to the degree of dependency involved and 
adjusted according to the evolution of this dependency. These products are closely 
related to annuitized products and their limited insurability is justified by some type of 
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 See Hoerger et al (1996) and Sloan et al (1997) on the empirical testing of parental altruism. Their results 
reject the strategic hypothesis, as the aid received by the elderly parent is independent from the number of 
children, from his/her wealth, and from his/her cognitive awareness, contrary to the theory. 
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ex post moral hazard.17 In long-term care, the degree of dependency can be assessed 
quite objectively; what is more subjective, or at least dependent on cultural and 
psychological factors, is the extent of the needs of the dependent person. The 
perception of long-term care as a risk is a very recent phenomenon, and the needs 
implied by a loss of autonomy are relatively vague and susceptible to widely varying 
interpretations depending on the social climate and the family background. For 
example, having trouble taking a bath constitutes a loss of autonomy that implies 
different demand for services depending on the people concerned. To avoid  lengthy 
and costly discussions, insurance companies prefer to offer a cash benefit that people 
can use each their own way, with the consequence that some individuals feel 
shorthanded. 
Whereas the form of the LTC insurance contract may seem to be an irrelevant detail for 
explaining the LTC puzzle, Cutler (1993) claims that the incomplete nature of the LTC 
insurance contract may be the major explanation of the puzzle. Cutler argues that, in 
the case of an LTC insurance, there exists, unlike for standard health insurance, a long 
delay between the purchase of the insurance and the first LTC expenditures and 
reimbursements. However, the risk of a rise in LTC costs per dependent person is high, 
and common to all members of a given cohort. Thus, according to Cutler, the unique 
way to insure oneself against a rise of LTC costs is to make intertemporal pooling (i.e. 
on several cohorts). Unfortunately, the large intertemporal correlation of LTC costs 
makes such a division of risk difficult, if not impossible. As a consequence, the risk of 
a rise in LTC costs over time looks like a risk against which one cannot be fully 
insured. That theoretical rationale explains why contracts now propose lump sum 
reimbursements (or numerous restrictions to reimbursement). Moreover, the fact that 
the LTC insurance is a quite risky business explains also the large required premia (and 
thus the excessive prices, see Section 2). But all this deters the elderly from buying a 
private LTC insurance, as this seems to be far from advantageous for him. This is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16
 Note that this discussion presupposes that there exists no insurance that children could buy to pay for their 
parents’ costs if necessary. Such an insurance could modify the parental strategic behaviour. 
17
 A type of moral hazard that cannot be taken care of by co-payments and/or deductibles. 
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another explanation of the LTC puzzle, which, as the previous ones, relies on the full 
rationality of agents, in the sense that the low demand for LTC private insurance would 
be, in each case, explained by rational calculations. Note, however, that this 
explanation differs from the previous ones, as it remains true even in the absence of 
high costs, and without any family solidarity or State intervention. 
 
6. Myopia or ignorance 
The explanations of the LTC insurance puzzle that have been discussed so far do not 
presuppose any particular behavioral imperfection of agents on the LTC insurance 
market: agents are fully rational, and the underdevelopment of LTC insurance is also 
rational. However, various alternative explanations of the puzzle involve some kind of 
behavioral imperfections, and are thus fundamentally different from the previous ones. 
Let us now turn to some of these. 
 When considering the low amounts of purchase of private LTC insurance around the 
world, one cannot forget that the decision under study involves the presence of a risk: 
the risk of old-age dependency. But it is even more important to notice that individual 
choices – either to purchase or not to purchase LTC insurance – are not necessarily 
based on the actual risk of old-age dependency, but, rather, reveal how elderly persons 
perceive the risk of old-age dependency, which is something different. 
In the LTC literature, there exist accurate empirical estimates of the risk of old-age 
dependency. For instance, according to Kemper and Murtaugh (1997), a person of age 
65 has a 0.43 probability to enter a nursing home. That probability is also shown to 
differ significantly between men and women: it is merely 0.33 for men (as their wife 
will generally be in a better health and thus will take care of them), and is above 0.50 
for women. Moreover, Murtaugh et al (1997) show that the stays at nursing homes are 
long : 15-20 % of newcomers will remain more than 5 years. Taken together, those 
estimates, if coupled with the large cost of LTC, should make a large proportion of the 
population at risk buy LTC private insurance. 
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However, it is doubtful that elderly persons are informed of those figures, and can 
manipulate those figures cautiously when making their decision to buy LTC insurance. 
Agents’ decision to buy or not to buy an insurance reveal their subjective probabilities 
of old-age dependency, and these may be significantly inferior to actual probabilities.18 
Whereas it is not trivial to measure subjective beliefs, the data presented by Finkelstein 
and McGarry (2003) suffice to cast some doubt on the elderly’s information and 
information processing capacity. According to the Asset and Health Dynamics survey, 
about 50 % of the surveyed population (with an average age of 79 years) reports a 
subjective probability of institutionalization within 5 years equal to 0. Such beliefs 
sounds overoptimistic, and, given the singular shape of the distribution of the 
subjective probability of institutionalization, one may have doubts about the overall 
quality of those beliefs.19 
Hence there may be a strong behavioral explanation to the LTC insurance puzzle. 
Whether this takes the form of some myopia, of some ignorance or of some bizarre 
attitude in front of risk remains to be clarified, but it seems clear that objective 
expected utility models with full information may not describe real choices adequately. 
 
7.  Denial of heavy dependence 
Finally, let us conclude our review of possible explanations of the LTC puzzle by 
another, still behavioral, explanation, which also deserves to be considered here. 
Clearly, when discussing LTC so far, we did as if the issue at stake concerned 
something that is common in everyday life. But old-age dependency is, by its very 
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 Regarding the formation of beliefs on the LTC risk, Courbage and Roudaut (2008) report that the facts of 
receiving an informal help, or of giving some informal help, have both a positive effect on the probability to 
purchase LTC insurance. This supports the crucial role played by subjective beliefs for the demand for LTC 
insurance. 
19
 That probability distribution has a second mode, at a level of 0.5 (for 15 % of the surveyed population). 
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nature, a singular event in one’s life, and, as a consequence, the insurance against LTC 
costs cannot be treated as a normal insurance (e.g. against domestic fires).20 
Heavy dependence, like death, generates anxiety, and this may imply the possibility of 
denial of dependence-relevant information, interacting with intertemporal choices. 
Such a denial is likely to lead to time-inconsistent decisions and other "behavioral" 
phenomena.21 Repression of signals of mortality leads to underinsurance for 
unsophisticated individuals.  Note that for forward-sophisticated individuals, the result 
can be reversed: they may over-insure in anticipation of future denial and seek 
commitment devices. Refusal to face up to the reality of dependence may help explain 
an inadequate purchase of LTC insurance. 
Whereas that kind of explanation of the LTC insurance puzzle shares some 
psychological, behavioral nature, with the one of Section 6 (myopia or ignorance), one 
should be careful before grouping these under the same heading. Clearly, while one 
may think about (more or less) easy ways to correct for myopia or ignorance (e.g. 
information campaigns, adequate taxes or subsidies), the same is not that obvious in 
case of denial. A denial is not a problem of not being able to perceive things, or of not 
being able to collect or process the information that is necessary for the decision to be 
made. It is the lack of will to do so. This kind of behavioral imperfection seems harder 
to overcome. If the LTC puzzle is due to a denial of old-age dependency, then policy 
implications would take forms that are radically different from the ones under other 
sources of the puzzle, as we shall discuss below. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
For years, researchers have been puzzled by the fact that so few people purchase 
lifetime annuities for their retirement portfolios. Rational theories have been proposed, 
but none can fully explain the small size of the actual market. This phenomenon has 
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 According to Istre et al (2001), the yearly rate of injured person due to domestic fire is about 5.2 per 100 000 
persons, with a significant heterogeneity (higher rates for the elderly). 
21
 On the denial of death and its behavioral consequences, see Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005). 
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been called the annuity puzzle. In the same vein, one can be surprised by the very low 
demand for LTC insurance, which cannot be explained by traditional lifecycle theories. 
The market is relatively thin in most countries. We have, in this short paper, considered 
a whole array of reasons, including psychological and behavioral ones, in order to solve 
the LTC insurance puzzle. The diversity of candidate explanations could hardly be 
overemphasized. Some explanations, such as excessive costs, the crowding out by the 
State, family concerns or inadequate contracts, rely on a full rationality of agents. 
Others, on the contrary, require behavioral imperfections, such as myopia, ignorance or 
denial. Thus some of those alternative explanations are not compatible with each 
others, and further empirical investigations are needed to be able to solve the LTC 
insurance puzzle. 
But beyond a need for further empirical testing of those alternative explanations of the 
LTC insurance puzzle, another relevant question raised by this overview is that of 
policy implications. If we really want to have a more attractive LTC insurance market, 
we have to see what can be done with respect to the 6 factors just discussed. First, there 
is the issue of adverse selection. By making the insurance mandatory at a given age, or 
by inducing a majority of households to subscribe to such insurance, the adverse 
selection pitfall can be overcome. Concerning the crowding out issue and the Good 
Samaritan matter, they can be avoided by enforcing the means tests and by extending 
them to the wealth of the family. There is no reason to fight family solidarity, but, at 
the same time, it is important to notice that LTC insurance can be a solution to the 
numerous cases where the altruism is forced. As to the phenomena of myopia or 
ignorance, they have to be treated separately. Ignorance can be fought by better 
informing people about the risk of dependence and the longevity prospects. Myopia 
arising from a problem of self control and duality of selves calls for some form of 
mandatory programs, exactly as the denial of heavy dependence does. 
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